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YOUTH’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THE MISSOURI JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM: IS THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT BEING 
UPHELD? 
The choices for juvenile justice systems are either great outcomes and no 
due process or great due process and no good outcomes. The trick is to mix the 
best of both worlds and marry procedure with compassion.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution, the supreme law of the land, sets forth that 
in every criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the right to the 
assistance of counsel for his defense.2 It commands no state “shall deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”3 
Before the development of juvenile courts, the law made no distinction 
between adult and juvenile4 offenders, but rather subjected children to the 
same punishments as adult criminals.5 In the nineteenth century, a reform 
effort, which was rooted in sixteenth century European educational reform, led 
to the establishment of the juvenile court in the United States.6 This reform 
movement changed society’s perception of children, from one of smaller adults 
to one of “persons with less than fully developed moral and cognitive 
abilities.”7 Yet, it was only a century ago that a separate justice system for 
juveniles was first established8 as a remedy for the state to intervene in the 
 
 1. MARY ANN SCALI ET AL., NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER, MISSOURI: JUSTICE 
RATIONED AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF JUVENILE DEFENSE 
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 36 (Spring 2013), available at http://www.nj 
dc.info/pdf/Missouri_Assessement.pdf [hereinafter NJDC ASSESSMENT] (quoting a juvenile court 
judge). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 4. The use of the term “juvenile” in this article refers to children under the age of 
seventeen. See MO. REV. STAT. § 211.021.1 (2013). 
 5. RICHARD LAWRENCE & CRAIG HEMMENS, JUVENILE JUSTICE: A TEXT/READER 21 
(2008) (recognizing that some punishments were very severe; “youth who committed serious 
offenses could be subjected to prison sentences, whipping, and even the death penalty”). 
 6. HOWARD N. SNEIDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 
1999 NATIONAL REPORT 86 (1999). 
 7. Id. 
 8. LAWRENCE & HEMMENS, supra note 5. 
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lives of children in a manner different from the way it intervened in the lives of 
adults.9 Since its inception, the focus of the juvenile justice system was on the 
juvenile offender, rather than the particular offense, and was based on the 
principle that youth are developmentally different from adults and more 
amenable to intervention.10 Under this philosophy, juvenile offenders were 
designated as “delinquent” rather than “criminal,” and the courts sought to turn 
juvenile delinquents into productive citizens by focusing on treatment rather 
than punishment.11 The juvenile was supposed to feel that he or she was the 
object of the state’s care, not that he or she was under arrest or on trial.12 Thus, 
the procedural formalities and due process protections afforded to adult 
defendants were deemed unnecessary in juvenile court.13 However, in 1967, 
the United States Supreme Court’s In re Gault decision revolutionized the 
procedural inhibitions in the juvenile court system by extending the principles 
of due process to delinquency proceedings; it held that accused youth facing 
the prospect of incarceration have the right to counsel.14 Today, the need for 
the assistance of counsel in juvenile court is even more essential, as more 
youth face the possibility of adult prosecution, dispositions have become 
longer and more punitive, and delinquency adjudications now carry 
consequences that follow the youth into adulthood or, in some cases, for the 
rest of their lives.15 
However, ever since the beginning of the juvenile court development, 
juveniles have been denied their constitutional rights of due process and the 
equal protections of the law.16 An individual’s constitutional right to assistance 
of counsel, guaranteed by the Constitution, is not exclusively for adults.17 In 
almost every jurisdiction, there are many rights that are granted to adults but 
withheld from juveniles.18 For example, juveniles are not entitled to bail, 
indictment by grand jury in a federal proceeding, a public trial, or trial by 
jury.19 Juveniles’ due process rights are violated when their legal interests are 
 
 9. SNEIDER & SICKMUND, supra note 6. 
 10. Id. 
 11. LAWRENCE & HEMMENS, supra note 5, at 24 (citing ROBERT M. MENNEL, THORNS AND 
THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1825–1940 (1973)) (explaining how 
children were considered less mature and less aware of their consequences as adults, so they were 
not to be held legally accountable for their behavior in the same manner as adults). 
 12. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967). 
 13. SNEIDER & SICKMUND, supra note 6, at 87. 
 14. Gault, 387 U.S. at 36–37. 
 15. Marsha Levick & Neha Desai, Still Waiting: The Elusive Quest to Ensure Juveniles a 
Constitutional Right to Counsel at All Stages of the Juvenile Court Process, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 
175, 175–76 (2007). 
 16. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 14–17. 
 17. Id. at 35. 
 18. Id. at 14. 
 19. Id. (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555, 555 n.22 (1966)). 
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not protected.20 Accordingly, juvenile defenders have an important and vital 
role in the discourse on public policy and juvenile justice reform.21 Children, 
most of all, need access to competent counsel when they come before the 
court, for when a child’s liberty and freedom are at risk, meaningful access to 
legal advice and counsel is essential.22 The juvenile defender must understand 
his or her role and be able to keep up with the growing body of scientific 
research and legal jurisprudence that applies directly to the representation of 
children.23 Without assistance from juvenile defenders, thousands of youth’s 
constitutional right to counsel, made possible by Gault, are significantly 
compromised.24 Juvenile defense attorneys are a critical buffer against injustice 
and are the heart of ensuring the juvenile court system operates fairly, 
accurately, and humanely.25 
“An effective juvenile justice system must encompass the foundational 
elements of fundamental fairness and due process” and must include legal 
advocacy and “zealous representation by competent and well-trained attorneys 
who uphold the rights of children at all critical stages.”26 In accordance with 
Gault, Missouri passed a juvenile code in 1995, which statutorily guaranteed 
children the right to counsel in juvenile court.27 Two years later, in 1997, the 
Missouri State Public Defender (MSPD) office recognized the importance of a 
juvenile’s right to counsel and created a Youth Advocacy Unit that provided 
specialized training to defenders and services to the juvenile clients.28 The unit 
was able to provide more attention and services directly to juveniles, since the 
defenders were able to gain firsthand knowledge of the particular needs and 
challenges facing juveniles.29 However, in 2007 the Youth Advocacy Unit 
dissipated into the MSPD’s general trial division,30 taking away the specialized 
resources for juvenile representation. Unfortunately, ensuring due process for 
juveniles in delinquency proceedings today is an extremely low priority in 
Missouri’s juvenile justice system.31 
 
 20. NJDC ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 7. 
 21. Wallace Mlyniec, Forward to LISA THURAU ET AL., NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENSE 
CENTER, NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENSE STANDARDS 6 (2012), available at http://www.njdc.info/ 
pdf/NationalJuvenileDefenseStandards2013.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENSE 
STANDARDS]. 
 22. Id. at 5. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 8. 
 25. Id. 
 26. NJDC ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 7. 
 27. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.211 (1989). 
 28. NJDC ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 54. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 25, 54. 
 31. Id. at 7. 
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This article argues that the current state of the juvenile justice system in 
Missouri is not providing adequate counsel to juveniles and will continue to be 
an issue if resources are not given to the juvenile division. Part II will explain 
the historical roots of the American juvenile court system and will indicate the 
importance of adequate representation for juveniles. Part III will examine the 
juvenile court system specifically as it pertains to Missouri. Part IV will 
provide an anecdotal account of the benefits of the Youth Advocacy Unit while 
it was in existence. Part V will discuss the current state of Missouri’s juvenile 
court system. 
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
A brief look at juvenile court history demonstrates that unbridled 
discretion, however benevolently motivated, is often a poor substitute for 
principle and procedure.32 Prior to the development of juvenile courts, the 
American justice system did not recognize a categorical difference between 
adults and juveniles and treated youthful offenders the same as any other adult 
in the criminal system.33 In fact, when juveniles were convicted of a criminal 
offense, they were subject to the same capital and corporal punishments as 
adult offenders,34 and even served prison sentences alongside adult criminals.35 
However, it was not long before an effort was made to reform the prison 
system.36 In the early 1800s, instead of being viewed as smaller versions of 
adults, children began to be viewed as persons at a unique stage of human 
development.37 Attempts were made to decriminalize juvenile offenders and 
the removal of youth from the adult criminal justice system began.38 Rather 
than being categorized as “criminals,” juvenile offenders were designated as 
“delinquent,” and the courts focused on treatment of the juvenile delinquent 
rather than punishment.39 Initially, troubled youth were taken into custody and 
 
 32. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967); Hon. Theodore McMillian & Dorothy Lear 
McMurtry, The Role of the Defense Lawyer in the Juvenile Court—Advocate or Social Worker?, 
14 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561 (discussing the claim that juveniles obtain benefits from the special 
procedures applicable to them, which more than offset the disadvantages of denial of due 
process). 
 33. ANN H. CROWE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JURISDICTIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR JUVENILE 
CORRECTIONS 26 (2000). 
 34. Sanford J. Fox, A Contribution to the History of the American Juvenile Court, 49 JUV. & 
FAM. CT. J. 7, 7 (1998). 
 35. CROWE, supra note 33. 
 36. See Fox, supra note 34. 
 37. CROWE, supra note 33. 
 38. Id. 
 39. LAWRENCE & HEMMENS, supra note 5, at 24 (citing Robert M. Mennel, Origins of the 
Juvenile Court: Changing Perspectives on the Legal Rights of Juvenile Delinquents, 18 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 68, 68–78 (1972)). 
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sentenced to newly created “Houses of Refuge,”40 which were institutions that 
would instruct delinquent youth in proper discipline and moral behavior.41 At 
the time, parents were expected to supervise and control their children; but if it 
became apparent that parents were not properly disciplining their children, the 
state would take over that responsibility.42 The state acted as parens patriae 
rather than prosecuting attorney and judge.43 The court believed that the state 
could provide better education and training for the child, which would be in the 
best interests of the child and the entire community.44 However, by the mid–
1800s, questions arose as to whether most youth benefitted from this practice.45 
Although these institutions were intended for education and treatment, sexual 
abuse, physical attacks by peers, and discrimination were well too common.46 
The Houses of Refuge were met with evidence that the state was not an 
effective or benevolent parent, but rather failed to practice what the doctrine of 
parens patriae had promised.47 
In 1899, an entirely separate court system for juveniles was developed,48 
and the United States’ first juvenile court was established in Chicago, 
Illinois.49 During this period, society began recognizing that there was a 
distinctive behavioral stage between childhood and adulthood.50 It was 
recognized that the time between childhood and adulthood provided an 
essential stage of social, emotional, and intellectual maturity.51 The Chicago 
 
 40. LAWRENCE & HEMMENS, supra note 5, at 21, 43; Fox, supra note 34, at 7 (describing 
“Houses of Refuge” as institutions with a program that “relied on the reforming influence of 
religion but was relatively benign and more appropriate to the immaturity of the inmates”). 
 41. LAWRENCE & HEMMENS, supra note 5, at 21 (citing ROBERT M. MENNEL, THORNS AND 
THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1825-1940, at 5–8, 15–16 (1973)). 
 42. LAWRENCE & HEMMENS, supra note 5, at 22, 24 (citing Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 
Pa. 48 (Pa. 1905)). 
 43. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554–55 (1966); See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, at 
16–17 (explaining that parens patriae is a Latin phrase used to describe the power of the state to 
act in place of a parent for the purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of the 
child). 
 44. LAWRENCE & HEMMENS, supra note 5, at 22 (citing Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 
1839)). 
 45. Id. at 22–23 (discussing how critics of the Houses of Refuge argued against state 
intervention for minor and noncriminal behavior and claimed that these reformatories were not 
providing the kind of care, education, or training that was promised under the parens patriae 
doctrine). 
 46. Id. at 22. 
 47. Id. at 23 (noting that the discipline in the Houses of Refuge was more brutal than 
parental, as the institutional environment had a corrupting influence on the juveniles, as 
evidenced by assaults, homosexual relations, and frequent escapes). 
 48. Id. at 24. 
 49. SNEIDER & SICKMUND, supra note 6, at 85. 
 50. See CROWE, supra note 33. 
 51. Id. 
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juvenile court established a core tradition in juvenile justice that was designed 
to remove the harshness of criminal procedure from juvenile delinquency 
proceedings.52 The parens patriae doctrine became the legal basis for court 
jurisdiction, staying true to the philosophy that children who violated the law 
were not to be treated as criminals.53 Juvenile court proceedings became more 
civil rather than criminal, as the purpose of the juvenile court was for the 
protection and treatment of the child rather than for punishment.54 The focus of 
the early juvenile court was to prevent potentially criminal children from 
actually becoming criminal, regardless of whether they were brought in front 
of the court for a criminal or status offense.55 Status offenders are children who 
come within the juvenile court jurisdiction for non-criminal behavior 
considered unacceptable solely because of their age.56 Such behavior includes 
truancy, behavior beyond parental control, behavior injurious to welfare, or 
when the child is a runaway and absent from the home.57 Since the juvenile 
court’s main purpose was to protect the child, juvenile court hearings were less 
formal than adult criminal proceedings, thus deeming the protections of due 
process, including the right to an attorney, completely unnecessary.58 
Consequently, dispositions59 were designed to serve the “best interests of the 
child” and treatment lasted until the child was “cured” or became an adult, 
whichever came first.60 With this came a concern about the growing number of 
juveniles who were institutionalized indefinitely, solely for the sake of 
treatment.61 
By 1945, all fifty states had a juvenile court.62 All the states seemed to 
generally agree on the goals and objectives of the juvenile justice system, and 
how it should be similar to, and distinct from, the adult criminal justice 
system.63 Around this time another paramount viewpoint began to emerge—
the view that a juvenile court judge must be willing to search out the causes of 
 
 52. Fox, supra note 34, at 9. 
 53. LAWRENCE & HEMMENS, supra note 5, at 24. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Marvin Ventrell, Evolution of the Dependency Component of the Juvenile Court, 49 JUV. 
& FAM. CT. J. 17, 17 (Fall 1998). 
 56. Jan C. Costello & Nancy L. Worthington, Incarcerating Status Offenders: Attempts to 
Circumvent the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
41, 42 (1981). 
 57. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.031(1)(2) (2012). 
 58. SNEIDER & SICKMUND, supra note 6, at 87. 
 59. Levick & Desai, supra note 15, at 180 (defining disposition as the equivalent of 
sentencing phase in adult criminal justice system). 
 60. SNEIDER & SICKMUND, supra note 6, at 87. 
 61. Id. 
 62. LAWRENCE & HEMMENS, supra note 5, at 25. 
 63. Id. (noting that the juvenile system did differ between some states and jurisdictions). 
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delinquency and formulate a plan for curing it.64 The complexity for 
determining delinquency was not “has this child committed a specific wrong?” 
but rather “what is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be 
done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a 
downward career?”65 The juvenile court was engaged in determining the needs 
of the child and of society by examining the background, social history, and 
family environment of the child in order to develop a treatment plan rather than 
to adjudicate criminal conduct.66 For approximately fifty years after its 
development, the method for processing juvenile cases in the juvenile court 
system went largely unchallenged.67 
However, toward the end of World War II, the juvenile justice system 
came under scrutiny for its insistence on an individualized administration of 
justice in all aspects of the court process and its critical dependence on vast 
amounts of discretion.68 In the 1950s, there became a growing concern for the 
number of juveniles institutionalized indefinitely for the sake of treatment and 
claims for fairness for juvenile offenders began to appear.69 Yet, it was not 
until the 1960s that the United States Supreme Court required that juvenile 
courts mandate more formal proceedings and begin to make juvenile courts 
more like adult criminal courts.70 
In 1966, Kent v. United States extended basic due process rights to 
juveniles being transferred to adult court and was the first Supreme Court case 
to modify the longstanding belief that juveniles did not require the same due 
process protections as adults.71 In Kent, the juvenile defendant’s counsel filed 
motions for a waiver hearing72 and for access to the juvenile’s social services 
file.73 The judge did not rule on the motion for a waiver hearing and waived 
 
 64. Fox, supra note 34, at 11. 
 65. Id. (describing how Judge Mack was the first to endorse a new innovative approach that 
emphasized how the judge was of paramount importance, and the ordinary legal evidence in a 
criminal court is not the same evidence that was to be heard in a juvenile proceeding). 
 66. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966); LAWRENCE & HEMMENS, supra note 5, 
at 25. 
 67. LAWRENCE & HEMMENS, supra note 5, at 25. 
 68. Fox, supra note 34, at 13. 
 69. SNEIDER & SICKMUND, supra note 6, at 87. 
 70. Id. For example, rather than the more lenient standard of a “preponderance of evidence,” 
the state must prove its case “beyond a reasonable doubt” during the adjudicatory stage of the 
juvenile court process. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
 71. LAWRENCE & HEMMENS, supra note 5, at 26. 
 72. A juvenile waiver hearing is “an individualized determination of whether jurisdiction 
over a given child should be ceded to adult criminal court;” it often involves the state offering 
evidence of the juvenile’s maturity or amenability to treatment in the juvenile system. Sarah 
Freitas, Extending the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to the Juvenile Waiver Hearing, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 301, 301 (1995). 
 73. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 545–46 (1966). 
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jurisdiction without holding a hearing or reciting any reason for the waiver.74 
The Supreme Court noted that some juvenile courts “lack the personnel, 
facilities and techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the State 
in a parens patriae capacity.”75 Thus, “the child receives the worst of both 
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous 
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.”76 The Court expressed 
that waiver of jurisdiction is a critically important action determining 
important statutory rights of the juvenile.77 Therefore, the waiver without a 
hearing was invalid, and the juvenile’s attorney was entitled to access to the 
social records. The Court held that basic due process rights applied, for the first 
time, to juvenile proceedings only involving waiver decisions.78 
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided its landmark decision In re Gault,79 
only one year after the Kent decision recognized that juveniles should be 
afforded due process rights when being transferred to adult court. Gault 
extended fundamental elements of due process to all juveniles, holding that 
juveniles have the right to counsel in all juvenile delinquency proceedings, 
even when remaining in the juvenile system.80 In this revolutionary case, 
Gault, while on probation, and a friend made an obscene telephone call to a 
neighbor.81 On the day of his hearing, an officer stated that Gault confessed to 
making the obscene remarks after he was questioned by officers out of the 
presence of his parents, without counsel, and without being advised of his right 
to remain silent.82 As a juvenile, the Court committed Gault to a correctional 
facility for an indefinite term of up to six years.83 However, had Gault been an 
adult, he would have been entitled to substantial rights under the Constitution 
and would have been subject, at most, to a minimal fine or two months 
imprisonment for his offense.84 Had Gault been an adult, the United States 
Constitution would guarantee him rights and protections in regard to arrest, 
search and seizure, and pretrial interrogation.85 It would assure him notice of 
the charges and time to decide his course of action and prepare his defense.86 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 555–56. 
 76. Id. at 556. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 557, 562. 
 79. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1 (1967). 
 80. Gault, 387 U.S. at 36; NJDC ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 15. 
 81. Gault, 387 U.S. at 4. 
 82. Id. at 5–7. 
 83. Id. at 29. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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His right to assistance of counsel would also have been made clear.87 If the 
Court acted on the basis of his confession, careful procedures would have been 
required to assure that it was made voluntarily.88 Thus, the Gault decision 
stressed that being a juvenile “does not justify a kangaroo court.”89 The court 
particularly noted how essential it was for any child facing the prospect of 
incarceration to receive “the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceeding against him.”90 
After Gault was decided, standards and guidelines began to develop in 
order to restructure the entire juvenile justice system, based on what the 
country had learned from its 150 years of experience with a separate justice 
system for juveniles.91 Juveniles and their due process rights began to gain 
national attention when Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act (JJDPA) in 1974.92 The act reflected growing concerns that the 
juvenile justice systems had adopted policies and practices contrary to their 
rehabilitative goals.93 The JJDPA created statutory mechanisms in order to 
protect the rights and welfare of juveniles.94 It also required states that accept 
JJDPA funds to demonstrate progress toward removing status offenders from 
secure facilities and developing non-secure programs to meet the needs of 
these children.95 In addition, the JJDPA required the National Advisory 
Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention to develop 
National Juvenile Justice Standards and Guidelines.96 The National Juvenile 
Justice Standards respond to the growing demands placed on the juvenile 
defender, incorporate research regarding adolescent development and social 
science into practice, and strengthen juvenile defense policy and practice.97 
Formulating a set of practice standards that clearly define the role of juvenile 
defenders is essential to improving the practice of juvenile law.98 
 
 87. Gault, 387 U.S. at 29. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 28. 
 90. Id. at 36 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)). 
 91. Fox, supra note 34, at 14. 
 92. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601–5681 (2012). 
 93. Costello & Worthington, supra note 56, at 50–51. 
 94. NJDC ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 16; See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601–5681. 
 95. Costello & Worthington, supra note 56, at 42. 
 96. NJDC ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 16. 
 97. NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 8. 
 98. Id. 
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III.  MISSOURI’S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
In 1903, Missouri’s first juvenile court was established in St. Louis, 
adopting nearly identical legislation as the first juvenile court in Chicago.99 In 
1995, the Missouri General Assembly enacted major revisions to the Missouri 
Juvenile Code,100 generating more punitive laws on juveniles in an effort to 
“get tough” on juvenile crime.101 Even though the state’s “child welfare 
policy” remained “the best interest of the child,” the new juvenile code 
removed language expressing that the juvenile was to preferably receive care, 
guidance, and control in his own home.102 The revision indicated that juvenile 
placements with social service facilities may be given for a determinate period 
of time, meaning that a child could now be “sentenced” to a rehabilitative 
institution regardless of the child’s treatment progress or the child’s ability to 
function at home.103 Most notably, the new code lowered the minimum age of 
certification from fourteen to twelve years old for a child who has committed 
an offense that would be considered a felony if committed by an adult.104 Yet, 
for the specific offenses of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, first-
degree assault, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, first-degree robbery, and 
distribution of drugs, or if the child has two prior adjudications or offenses 
which would be felonies if committed by an adult, the minimum age for 
certification was removed altogether, stating a certification hearing was now 
mandatory at any age.105 
Today, a Missouri judicial circuit, the juvenile, or the family court has 
exclusive jurisdiction in juvenile cases involving delinquency where a person 
is alleged to have committed a status offense, or is alleged to have violated 
state law or municipal ordinance, prior to becoming seventeen.106 The juvenile 
 
 99. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Where the Judiciary Prosecutes in Front of Itself: Missouri’s 
Unconstitutional Juvenile Court Structure, 78 Mo. L. Rev. 1245, 1270 (2013). 
 100. Caterina DiTraglia, “The Worst of Both Worlds”: Defending Children in Juvenile Court, 
63 MO. L. REV. 477, 478 (1998). 
 101. Id. at 477. 
 102. Id. at 478–79. Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 211.011 (1994), with MO. REV. STAT. § 
211.011 (Supp. 1997). 
 103. DiTraglia, supra note 100, at 480 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 211.181(4) (Supp. 1997)); 
Costello & Worthington, supra note 56, at 52 (this was in contrast to the JJDPA assumption that 
children should remain with their families or in their communities whenever possible). 
 104. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071(1) (Supp. 1997); DiTraglia, supra note 100, at 479. 
 105. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071(1) (Supp. 1997); DiTraglia, supra note 100, at 479. 
 106. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.031.1(3) (Supp. 2013). Status offenders are children who come 
within the juvenile court jurisdiction for non-criminal behavior. Although they have not 
committed crimes (acts for which adults could be arrested and confined), they are taken into 
custody, held in secured facilities, and are often times detained longer than children charged with 
crimes. Thus, when status offenders are incarcerated, it is for behavior that is considered 
unacceptable solely because of their age. Costello & Worthington, supra note 56, at 42; SUPREME 
COURT OF MO. OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADM’R (OSCA), MISSOURI JUVENILE & FAMILY 
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courts may retain jurisdiction over a child until he or she reaches the age of 
twenty-one.107 Missouri incorporates the constitutional requirement of the right 
to counsel for juveniles accused of crimes, stating that Missouri children are 
“entitled to be represented by counsel in all proceedings.”108 This juvenile 
defense representation operates in three basic stages: (1) the certification stage, 
where the court must decide whether the child should stand trial as an adult; 
(2) the adjudicatory stage, where the child’s guilt or innocence is at issue; and 
(3) the dispositional stage, where the court must decide where to place a child 
who is convicted of a crime.109 
The additional stages of juvenile court generally address intake, detention, 
transfer to the adult system, adjudication, disposition, post-disposition parole 
or probation, and final release from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.110 The 
“intake” decision looks at whether the juvenile should be formally referred to 
juvenile court or diverted from the juvenile system.111 A lawyer is needed to 
advocate in the child’s defense if there is not sufficient evidence to determine 
if probable cause exists, and to prevent the child from being labeled a juvenile 
delinquent or from even being caught up in the court processes.112 If the 
juvenile is formally referred to juvenile court, a “detention” hearing is held to 
determine whether the child should be released or detained awaiting the 
adjudicatory hearing; it is the juvenile’s first appearance in court and the 
 
DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT CALENDAR 2012, at 6 (2012), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/ 
file.jsp?id=62834 (explaining that status offenses include behavior injurious to oneself or others, 
habitually absent from home, truancy, and beyond parental control as well as that the juvenile 
court also has jurisdiction over child abuse and neglect cases, where the child is the victim or 
custody related matters are an issue). 
 107. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.041 (Supp. 2013); NJDC ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 26 
(explaining that the juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction with (1) the municipal court over 
any child alleged to have violated a municipal curfew ordinance; (2) the circuit court for any child 
who is alleged to have violated a state or municipal ordinance involving use of any tobacco 
product; and (3) the adult court for a youth younger than seventeen years old who has been 
transferred to adult court and whose prosecution results in conviction or plea of guilty, if the court 
chooses to invoke dual jurisdiction and impose a juvenile disposition that would postpone the 
execution of an adult criminal sentence). 
 108. MO REV. STAT. § 211.211 (2013). 
 109. DiTraglia, supra note 100, at 483. 
 110. Levick & Desai, supra note 15, at 178. 
 111. Id. at 179 (citing Gary S. Katzman, Introduction: Issues and Institutions, in SECURING 
OUR CHILDREN’S FUTURE: NEW APPROACHES TO JUVENILE JUSTICE AND YOUTH VIOLENCE 1, 
10–11 (Gary S. Katzman ed., 2002) (stating that diversion may include diversion entirely from 
juvenile court, diversion to another system such as the dependency or mental health system, or 
diversion to a specialty court such as a drug court)). 
 112. McMillian & McMurtry, supra note 32, at 576–77. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
162 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV:151 
child’s first opportunity to meet with counsel.113 During the detention hearing, 
the attorney must ensure that the child’s detention is in accordance with the 
juvenile code, which calls into play all of the legal faculties of the lawyer for 
the child.114 “Transfer” or “certification” refers to the prosecution of juveniles 
as adults in the criminal justice system or based on the seriousness of the crime 
with which they are charged.115 The attorney must ensure that the findings of 
the transfer hearing have met all the criteria needed to certify the child as an 
adult.116 The “adjudicatory” phase is the trial phase, and it is the child’s rights 
during this hearing that In re Gault primarily addressed.117 
If the child is found guilty after the hearing or admits guilt to the charges, 
the court will proceed to “disposition,” which is the equivalent of the 
sentencing phase in the adult criminal justice system.118 The length of the 
dispositional order has no fixed completion date and will generally turn on the 
court’s determination that the juvenile has successfully completed the 
requirements of the program or other specific provisions of the disposition 
order.119 During disposition, the attorney may argue for a particular 
disposition, present testimony in support of the recommendation, and suggest 
an alternative disposition not known to the court.120 The “post-disposition” 
phase is the period of a juvenile’s release from an institution or facility when 
he or she remains on “aftercare probation,” which is the equivalent of parole 
for adults; but the juvenile is still subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court.121 Counsel is also needed to advise the child of his right to appeal any 
final judgment.122 At any one of the hearings, proceedings, or stages previously 
described, juveniles undeniably need assistance of counsel.123 
 
 113. Levick & Desai, supra note 15, at 179 (citing Gary S. Katzman, Introduction: Issues and 
Institutions, in SECURING OUR CHILDREN’S FUTURE: NEW APPROACHES TO JUVENILE JUSTICE 
AND YOUTH VIOLENCE 1, 10–11 (Gary S. Katzman ed., 2002)). 
 114. McMillian & McMurtry, supra note 32, at 578. 
 115. Levick & Desai, supra note 15, at 179–80 (explaining that typically the prosecutor 
requests the judge to transfer youth into the adult system when the juvenile is above a certain age 
and has been charged with a particularly serious felony, and must also demonstrate that the 
juvenile is not amenable to treatment in available juvenile facilities). 
 116. McMillian & McMurtry, supra note 32, at 591; See MO. REV. STAT. 211.071(6) (Supp. 
2013) (stating that the criteria for certification includes but is not limited to the age of the child, 
whether the act alleged would be a felony if committed by an adult, and whether or not the child 
can benefit from the treatment or rehabilitative programs available to the juvenile court). 
 117. Levick & Desai, supra note 15, at 180. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 181. 
 120. McMillian & McMurtry, supra note 32, at 593–94. 
 121. Levick & Desai, supra note 15, at 182. 
 122. McMillian & McMurtry, supra note 32, at 598–99. 
 123. Interview with Caterina DiTraglia, Assistant Fed. Pub. Defender, E. Dist. of Mo., in St. 
Louis, Mo. (Jan. 31, 2014). 
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However, Missouri law structures juvenile courts in a unique manner. At a 
minimum, each of Missouri’s forty-five judicial circuits has a judge who 
oversees the juvenile office in charge of all juvenile court cases.124 Each 
juvenile office has a lead juvenile officer who supervises key system players, 
such as legal officers and deputy juvenile officers (DJOs).125 The DJO’s role in 
Missouri was first created in 1903 and was strengthened in 1957 when 
legislation gave DJOs authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion, in an 
attempt to reduce the stigma of being charged with a delinquent act and 
committed to a detention facility.126 When a juvenile is taken into custody he 
or she immediately must be taken directly before the judicial court or delivered 
to the DJO.127 The DJO makes a preliminary inquiry of the facts to determine 
whether there is probable cause to believe that a juvenile has committed a 
delinquent offense.128 
The DJO occupies an unusual position in Missouri’s juvenile justice 
system.129 Missouri law establishes that DJOs are judicial branch officials 
hired by, supervised by, and subject to termination by juvenile court judges.130 
DJOs have the authority to make arrests and are responsible for protecting the 
interests of the juvenile.131 Since the DJO chooses whether to file juvenile 
court cases, what charges to file against a juvenile, and what recommendations 
to make to the judge throughout the case, they serve both as a party 
prosecuting petitions and as an advocate furthering the juvenile’s position.132 
This role of the DJO, acting both as an arm of the prosecution and as advocate 
for juveniles’ due process rights, is unique to Missouri DJOs.133 This is 
problematic because the DJO is not seen as adversarial to the juvenile—there 
is a “relationship of trust and confidence between the child and DJO [acting] as 
the first indispensible step to rehabilitation.”134 In contrast, a prosecuting 
attorney seeks to prosecute individuals for crimes.135 These two roles are 
 
 124. NJDC ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 22. 
 125. Id. (equating legal officers with prosecuting attorneys and DJOs with probation officers). 
 126. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 99, at 1271. 
 127. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.031 (Supp. 2013); In re M. C., 504 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1974). 
 128. JUVENILE DIV., CITY OF ST. LOUIS FAMILY COURT, CITY OF ST. LOUIS FAMILY COURT 
REPORT TO THE COMMUNITY 2012, at 8 (2012), available at http://www.stlcitycircuitcourt.com/ 
juvenile/2013%20Juv%20docs/Report%20to%20the%20Community%202012.pdf (explaining 
that DJOs conduct interviews of juveniles, parents, victims, witnesses, and law enforcement). 
 129. In re M.C., 504 S.W.2d at 646. 
 130. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.351; Gupta-Kagan, supra note 99, at 1245, 1249. 
 131. NJDC ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 23. 
 132. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 99, at 1250. 
 133. NJDC ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 23. 
 134. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 99, at 1273 (quoting In re F.C., 484 S.W.2d 21, 25 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1972)). 
 135. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 99, at 1273. 
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incompatible because a DJO cannot create a parens patriae relationship with a 
juvenile if he is also a prosecutor.136 As a result, in Missouri’s juvenile court, 
the judiciary essentially prosecutes in front of itself.137 
It should be noted that not all juvenile cases fall within the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile courts.138 A child between the ages of twelve and seventeen who 
has committed an offense that would be considered a felony if committed by 
an adult can be transferred or “certified” to adult court.139 In the case of certain 
serious felonies, there is no age limit for certification, and the court must hold 
a hearing before deciding to dismiss the juvenile petition and transfer the case 
to adult court.140 The juvenile court has discretion over whether a juvenile 
petition should be dismissed and transferred to adult court.141 If the juvenile 
court relinquishes jurisdiction and allows the juvenile to be prosecuted in adult 
court, juvenile court jurisdiction is terminated forever, unless the child is found 
not guilty.142 Missouri law allows for an invocation of dual jurisdiction when 
sentencing a certified juvenile, which allows the court to impose a juvenile 
disposition as a condition of the suspended adult criminal sentence.143 Sending 
children into adult courts, rather than the juvenile justice system, needlessly 
destroys lives and further endangers the public by turning nonviolent youth 
into hardened criminals.144 Federally financed studies have shown that minors 
prosecuted as adults commit more violent crimes later in life and are more 
likely to become career criminals than those sent through juvenile courts, 
where they receive counseling and family support.145 
IV.  AN ANECDOTAL ACCOUNT OF THE MISSOURI YOUTH ADVOCACY UNITS 
Missouri’s juvenile code strives to facilitate the care, protection, and 
discipline of children who come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in 
Missouri.146 Missouri’s juvenile code is intended to be construed liberally, so 
that each juvenile shall receive such care, guidance, and control as will 
contribute toward the child’s welfare.147 The child welfare policy in the state of 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1249. 
 138. NJDC ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 26. 
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 140. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071.1 (Supp. 2013); NJDC ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 26. 
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Missouri is governed by the best interest of the child.148 When the child is 
removed from the control of his or her parents, the court is responsible for 
providing care that is as “nearly as possible equivalent” to that which should 
have been given to the child by his or her parents.149 The Youth Advocacy Unit 
was once Missouri’s most proficient resource for protecting the best interests 
of the child and securing the kind of care the child’s parents should have given 
the child. 
In response to the 1995 Missouri juvenile legislation putting more 
emphasis on punishment rather than rehabilitation,150 the MSPD established a 
juvenile defender division, called the Youth Advocacy Unit, in 1997, to serve 
St. Louis City and St. Louis County.151 The unit was designed to be a model 
for juvenile representation throughout the state and to help train other public 
defender offices with smaller juvenile caseloads.152 At its outset, the Youth 
Advocacy Unit was relatively large, consisting of three advocates in the county 
and four advocates in the city, plus a district defender, two dispositional 
specialists, and two investigators.153 The initial vision was to progress the 
Youth Advocacy Unit by having units in St. Louis, Kansas City, and a third 
somewhere in the middle of the state in an attempt to handle all juvenile cases 
in the state of Missouri.154 
The driving force behind the implementation of the Youth Advocacy Unit 
was Cathy DiTraglia, who drafted the first proposal for a dedicated juvenile 
office in 1996 and presented suggestions to the Missouri Public Defender 
Commission on what could be done to improve the representation for 
children.155 She presented on how to give juveniles effective counsel and how 
juvenile representation needed to be improved in order to reduce recidivism.156 
During this time, one issue with the juvenile court was the large number of 
juvenile caseloads, averaging around 100 to 200 cases per attorney.157 
Although juvenile cases are not as complicated as adult trial cases, the volume 
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 150. Youth Advocacy, MO. STATE PUB. DEFENDER, http://www.publicdefender.mo.gov/legal/ 
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Law, in St. Louis, Mo. (Jan. 23, 2014). 
 154. Interview with Caterina DiTraglia, supra note 123 (noting that a Youth Advocacy was 
set up in Kansas City, Missouri in 2000, but a unit was never formed in the middle of the state); 
Interview with Patricia Harrison, Assistant Professor, St. Louis Univ. Sch. Of Law, in St. Louis, 
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and nature158 of the practice was impossible to manage.159 Attorneys tended to 
triage their cases by putting most of their time and energy in deciding a course 
of action for the more serious cases and often preparing less for the others.160 
Consequently, many juveniles were not receiving good representation.161 
However, part of the Youth Advocacy Unit’s philosophy was that each 
attorney should have between twenty-five to thirty juvenile cases at a time, 
with the expectation that attorneys were going to great lengths to advocate the 
cases in more detail, due to their lower caseload.162 
The main goal of the Youth Advocacy Unit was to professionalize the 
juvenile justice system, developing an area of expertise in juvenile 
representation that changed the way juveniles were represented.163 Before the 
unit was in existence, inexperienced attorneys would begin their career in the 
juvenile justice system and leave, within six months to a year, for a position in 
the adult justice system.164 New attorneys lacked the experience and skills 
necessary to represent juveniles. However, the Youth Advocacy Unit sought to 
keep the attorneys in juvenile court long enough for them to develop an 
experienced-based expertise.165 Most attorneys in the Youth Advocacy Unit 
stayed three to five years on average, which allowed the defenders to supply 
more traditional representation to their juvenile clients.166 Due to their 
longevity in the juvenile justice system, more attorneys began deposing 
witnesses, making discovery requests, and appealing more cases.167 
Furthermore, the attorneys in the Youth Advocacy Unit received 
specialized training on how to handle juvenile cases. Based on their research 
and knowing what the law was at the time, the original attorneys in the unit 
had a good idea of what needed to be done and what needed to be changed168 
as far as providing adequate representation for juveniles. The problem was 
successfully litigating these issues.169 In order to aid with this, representatives 
from a similar project in Massachusetts conducted a series of informal 
meetings with the initial attorneys in the Youth Advocacy Unit, where they 
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discussed how to approach and litigate certain situations that occurred in 
juvenile representation.170 Additionally, the unit provided specialized training 
on juvenile confessions and on how to analyze whether a juvenile fully 
understood his or her rights.171 The specialist discussed juvenile brain 
development, which showed that because of a juvenile’s lack of maturity and 
lack of experience, juveniles feel compelled to talk with authorities.172 
Attorneys in the Youth Advocacy Unit were even sent to conferences, 
including a national conference in Washington, D.C., specifically focusing on 
representation in juvenile court.173 As the unit progressed, the MSPD office 
became very supportive in offering specialized juvenile training to the 
attorneys in the unit.174 For the most part, services and training were always 
available and the attorneys in the Youth Advocacy Unit were encouraged to 
take advantage of those opportunities.175 
When a juvenile case was brought to the Youth Advocacy Unit, a defender 
would begin handling the case at the detention and keep the case through 
disposition and adjudication.176 The defenders in the unit would receive the 
juvenile’s affidavit and meet with the child within twenty-four hours of his or 
her detention.177 Having a defender present during this stage allowed them to 
review the police reports and call the juvenile’s family, if need be, in 
preparation for the detention hearings.178 At the time, the Youth Advocacy 
Unit had an agreement with the court in which an advocate from the unit 
would always be present at the detention hearing, regardless of whether the 
juvenile qualified for a public defender or not.179 If the juvenile qualified for a 
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public defender, an attorney from the unit would open a case for them.180 Ellen 
Ribaudo, who was an attorney in the Youth Advocacy Unit in its early stages, 
remembers the unit having a liberal outlook on the guidelines for indigency,181 
much like the intention for the liberal construction of the juvenile code. Very 
often the unit would take juveniles who did not meet the requirements because 
it did not know if the child’s parents would be willing or have the means to 
hire a private attorney, depending on the juvenile’s or the family’s 
circumstances.182 
Furthermore, Jacqueline Kutnik-Bauder, who was part of the Youth 
Advocacy Unit’s original group of attorneys and tried over fifty cases in her 
three years with the unit, mentioned a higher rate of innocent clients when 
working with juveniles.183 Acquittals and dismissals are also more prevalent in 
juvenile court because there is less evidence and less support for the juvenile 
cases.184 Due to the lack of evidence, DiTraglia stressed the importance of 
having an attorney at the beginning stages of a juvenile case to see whether a 
child is not guilty, or guilty of less than what they are officially charged.185 The 
Youth Advocacy Unit had the ability to start a case in its early stages because 
the unit had the means to delegate an investigator to work with the police and a 
social worker to work with the child.186 With these resources, an experienced 
advocate in the unit was able to show the court at a low level if a child was 
innocent and potentially save the child from going to detention.187 DiTraglia 
asserts that the damage done to a child who is put in a detention center for a 
month, and not sent home, is much different than the harm done to an adult in 
the adult system.188 Adequate counsel is important to determine whether or not 
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the prosecution can prove its case, and if not, the attorney can possibly protect 
the child from an unfavorable conviction.189 
While the Youth Advocacy Unit provided advocates with specialized 
juvenile training and resources, the unit’s most noteworthy asset was the 
juvenile dispositional specialist, who was responsible for developing client-
driven disposition plans and placement options.190 The disposition was an 
important stage for advocates in the unit because this was the first time counsel 
had the opportunity to litigate the question of what was the best treatment 
option for a convicted child.191 Before the Youth Advocacy Unit, if the 
disposition was disliked or unfavorable to the client, defenders would simply 
cross-examine the DJO, but the defender would almost never offer any 
alternatives or other options for the court to consider.192 There was a “pre-unit” 
assumption that the dispositional phase involved social work, which is not part 
of an attorney’s job, so the attorney did not take part in the child’s 
disposition.193 However, advocates in the Youth Advocacy Unit took the 
position that disposition is part of the entire litigation of the juvenile’s case, so 
the attorney has an additional impact in the disposition stage.194 With this 
view, the unit started presenting its juvenile clients differently to the court, by 
bringing in dispositional specialists to explain how the juvenile would benefit 
from an alternative approach.195 The disposition specialist, acting as an expert 
for the court, was able to conduct social investigations and locate available 
resources to help the juvenile client with treatment needs.196 For example, 
Kutnik-Bauder explained, if the DJO suggested the juvenile should go to the 
Division of Youth Services (DYS) because the juvenile had been previously on 
probation, the dispositional specialist would go out and meet with the 
family.197 If the dispositional specialist found that the child had a drug 
problem, they would offer a drug treatment program as an alternative to going 
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to a facility.198 The dispositional specialist made possible the way the children 
were sentenced199 by doing research and finding sources that the attorney did 
not have or may not have had time to find.200 The value of the dispositional 
specialist was not just to find alternatives for disposition, but also to help the 
defenders prepare a defense and find mitigating evidence to keep the juvenile 
out of the adult system.201 
For instance, Kutnik-Bauder recalls one particular case where the 
dispositional specialist was crucial to the juvenile’s future.202 The juvenile was 
about fifteen years old when she became involved with an older man and 
started robbing banks in both Missouri and Illinois.203 She was arrested in 
Illinois and was sentenced to two years in the Illinois juvenile system.204 
During the time she served in Illinois, she came to be known as a “model 
prisoner”—someone who really made a change from her experience in the 
system.205 The juvenile was released from detention in Illinois when she was 
seventeen years old.206 However, Missouri knew that she had been sentenced 
in Illinois and chose not to file charges against her until she was released.207 
The juvenile was transferred to the Missouri juvenile court system, which in 
turn wanted to certify her as an adult for felony bank robbery, claiming there 
was a lack of services available for her because she was seventeen and too old 
for the juvenile programs.208 Ironically, Missouri created this situation by not 
pursuing charges against her earlier.209 Kutnik-Bauder held a daylong 
certification hearing and had the psychologist from the juvenile’s program in 
Illinois testify about how well she had done and the situation she was in by the 
manipulation of an older man.210 Kutnik-Bauder also had someone from 
Missouri’s DYS talk about the programs they had in which they could keep the 
juvenile until she was twenty-one years old.211 With the help from the 
dispositional specialist, Kutnik-Bauder successfully persuaded the court not to 
certify the juvenile as an adult.212 The juvenile was sentenced to only one year 
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in DYS.213 Before the Youth Advocacy Unit, an attorney most likely would not 
have brought in additional witnesses and the juvenile’s dispositional outcome 
would probably have been very different. 
In the years before the Youth Advocacy Unit existed, many attorneys 
forwent deposing witnesses or other traditional forms of discovery.214 
However, the Youth Advocacy Unit changed that practice. Advocates in the 
unit began doing discovery requests, filing writs, and appealing more cases to a 
higher court.215 For example, Dan Underwood, who was an attorney for and 
became a director of the Youth Advocacy Unit, argued a case of first 
impression on extradition and competency to the Missouri Supreme Court.216 
In 2001, Joe Reed was brought to St. Louis City juvenile court on various 
felony charges.217 While awaiting adjudication, the state of Illinois sought to 
have Joe extradited because he was accused of armed robbery and aggravated 
vehicular hijacking in East St. Louis, Illinois.218 During the course of 
proceedings to certify Joe to stand trial as an adult, questions arose about 
whether Joe was competent to understand the proceedings and his extradition 
out of the state of Missouri.219 Joe was evaluated by two different psychiatrists, 
one procured by Underwood and one by the Missouri Department of Mental 
Health; both determined that Joe lacked capacity to participate in the 
certification hearing.220 However, the circuit judge denied Joe a competency 
hearing.221 Advocating for Joe, Underwood appealed to the Missouri Supreme 
Court to stay the extradition and to request a competency hearing, arguing that 
it was a violation of Joe’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel 
if they extradited him without first determining his competency.222 The 
Missouri Supreme Court remanded and held that the trial court was prohibited 
from moving forward with the hearing without first determining Joe’s 
competency.223 The court particularly noted that the right to counsel is an 
“empty formality” if it is not also assumed to be effective.224 Juveniles do not 
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need a “warm body” to represent them in court; they need effective counsel 
who will go to great lengths to advocate their case in detail. 
In addition to providing more traditional representation to juveniles, the 
Youth Advocacy Unit also reduced the number of adult certifications and DYS 
commitments.225 In 2001, Missouri had 121 certifications to adult court,226 
while in 2005, two years before the Youth Advocacy Unit disbanded, Missouri 
only had sixty-eight certifications.227 Certifying less juveniles also had an 
impact on recidivism. Studies have shown that children placed in the adult 
prison system have higher rates of recidivism than comparable children 
incarcerated in the juvenile system for the same offenses.228 Thus, certifying 
children and placing them in adult prison does not prevent children from 
committing crimes.229 Additionally, if a juvenile was certified, the Youth 
Advocacy Unit was able to provide the same defender who represented him or 
her in juvenile court to litigate the juvenile’s certification proceedings and jury 
trial in the adult system.230 Familiarity with the case and consistency for the 
child is a large part of juvenile representation,231 and the Youth Advocacy Unit 
recognized this importance. 
However, even during the unit’s prime, Patricia Harrison, who was the 
unit’s director from 2000–2002, could sense things in the Youth Advocacy 
Unit starting to turn.232 As the Public Defender Commission started asking 
questions about juvenile caseloads and expressed a need to spread its resources 
wider, Harrison knew the philosophy of the public defender was shifting.233 
After Harrison, Dan Underwood became the director of the unit from 2002–
2005.234 Underwood also recognized changes over the time he was there. 
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When Underwood arrived as an attorney in 1999, the Youth Advocacy Unit 
had eight attorneys plus a district defender, dispositional specialists, and 
investigators; when he left in 2005, the unit was down to four attorneys and a 
district defender.235 During this time, the state of Missouri was in the middle of 
a drastic budget crisis, which cut the MSPD’s budget, which in turn cut the 
Youth Advocacy Unit’s social work support for children and scaled back the 
investigative support.236 The four attorneys left in the unit started receiving 
higher caseloads, and a regression occurred, as judges once again began 
certifying more children.237 Finally, in 2007, the Youth Advocacy Unit fell 
victim to the state’s budget cuts and the unit’s caseload was absorbed into the 
MSPD general trial division.238 The MSPD’s new attorneys were brought in to 
handle the juvenile cases while simultaneously managing another caseload in 
the adult system.239 
In the years the Youth Advocacy Unit was in existence (1997–2007), the 
MSPD was assigning, on average, over 4,000 juvenile cases to the unit.240 Just 
one year after the unit dissipated, the MSPD only assigned 2,715 juvenile cases 
to the trial division, almost half of what they were assigning when the unit was 
in existence.241 The Public Defender Commission noted in its 2007 report, 
“The [Youth Advocacy Unit was] doing good work; however, with the 
shortage of resources in the rest of the system, the extra resources devoted to 
juvenile practice could no longer be supported.”242 The commission stated 
there was nowhere else MSPD could eliminate, reduce, or change to strengthen 
the system.243 It also recognized that the elimination of the Youth Advocacy 
Unit was a major step backward and a failure of Missouri’s public defender 
system.244 
V.  YOUTH’S COUNSEL IN MISSOURI’S JUVENILE COURT TODAY 
Despite numerous reform efforts, federal law, and the renowned Supreme 
Court cases, Missouri is still struggling to effectively implement juveniles’ 
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right to counsel, almost half a century after the Gault decision.245 On 
November 19, 2013, the Justice Department announced a federal investigation 
into the St. Louis County Family Court for potential violations of juveniles’ 
constitutional rights.246 In particular, the department announced that it was 
examining whether Missouri’s largest circuit court provides due process to all 
juveniles appearing for delinquency hearings and whether its juvenile court 
system engages in a “systematic pattern or practice that causes harm.”247 
Missouri’s juvenile justice system has been criticized for failing to adequately 
represent juveniles facing court action.248 “A National Juvenile Defender 
Center report said Missouri juvenile courts discourage juveniles from talking 
to a legal representative, fail to protect their rights, and employ staff members 
with conflicted roles.”249 
Ironically, Missouri’s rehabilitative juvenile correctional program, known 
as the “Missouri Model,” is nationally recognized for its progressive approach 
and its success.250 This model may offer some pretext as to why the adequacy 
of juvenile representation in Missouri seems to be neglected. Particularly, the 
Missouri Model has generated extremely low recidivism rates for juvenile 
offenders in Missouri;251 even other states are using this approach and 
receiving positive results.252 From 2005 through the first half of 2007, Missouri 
managed to reduce its adult prison population by applying techniques from the 
Missouri Model.253 The model’s approach is to improve its juvenile corrections 
system by focusing on the juvenile offenders who must be removed from the 
community and placing them in small, regionally dispersed facilities, as 
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opposed to large, prisonlike correctional institutions.254 In particular, the 
Missouri Model is epitomized by six core characteristics: (1) placing youth 
who require confinement into smaller facilities, (2) placing youth into closely 
supervised small groups with a rigorous group treatment process, (3) 
emphasizing the importance of keeping youth safe from physical aggression 
and emotional abuse, (4) helping youth develop skills that improve their ability 
to succeed post-release, (5) reaching out to family members and involving 
them in the youth’s treatment process, and (6) providing support and 
supervision for transitioning home from a residential facility.255 The Missouri 
Model embodies the objective of the juvenile court, which is to “provide 
measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child, not to fix criminal 
responsibility.”256 
However, juveniles’ “due process protections often lose out under the 
guise of rehabilitation and treatment.”257 This is evidenced by the fact that a 
very high number of youth are committed to DYS for technical violations, 
status offenses, misdemeanors, and non-violent felony offenses. Of the 919 
youth committed to DYS in 2013, 38% were committed for class C, D, and 
other unspecified felonies, including property offenses, drug crimes, and 
theft.258 Of that same number of youth, 37% were committed to DYS for 
misdemeanors and other non-felonies, and 12% were committed for juvenile 
offenses such as truancy and curfew violations,259 resulting in a 2% increase 
from 2012.260 The fact that the majority of youth committed to DYS are there 
for non-violent, low-level offenses and technical violations emphasizes the 
need for adequate juvenile representation.261 
While Missouri is a well-known national leader for its innovative, 
rehabilitative juvenile corrections programs,262 its juvenile court system today 
is far from exemplary. Attorneys representing juveniles must be well-trained 
and qualified to make sure that the needs and best interests of the child are 
appropriately met. Recently, in 2010, the Supreme Court noted in its Graham 
v. Florida decision that there are special difficulties attorneys encounter when 
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representing juveniles.263 The characteristics that distinguish juveniles from 
adults also put them at a disadvantage in criminal proceedings.264 Juveniles 
mistrust adults and have limited understandings of the criminal justice system 
and the roles of the institutional actors within it.265 Correspondingly, juveniles 
are less likely than adults to work effectively with their attorneys to prepare 
their defense.266 Even a juvenile who has violated the law may not feel that he 
or she is being fairly treated and may resist the rehabilitative efforts of court 
personnel.267 Thus, juvenile defenders require specialized knowledge and 
understanding of adolescence and the ability to engage their youthful clients in 
making effective decisions toward their defense.268 
Hence, it is essential for the public defender system to appreciate that 
children and adolescents differ from adults in significant ways.269 Common 
sense dictates that most children are ill-equipped to understand, manage, or 
navigate the complexities of the court system on their own.270 Many juveniles 
are unable to understand their legal rights, which suggests an even greater need 
for an attorney271 who is trained and experienced to make skilled inquiries into 
the facts and to “cope with problems of law.”272 Additionally, every 
professional working with the juvenile also should have a basic understanding 
of adolescent brain development.273 Adolescence is a time of enhanced 
vulnerability.274 Research has shown that youth are generally more compliant 
and vulnerable to coercion from adults.275 When juveniles are faced with the 
stress and pressures of the court system, they may appear defiant; however, in 
actuality they may just be overwhelmed with too much information.276 
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Juveniles may not be able to respond rationally when asked certain questions 
because they react impulsively without thinking things through first.277 The 
thought patterns and skills for rational thinking and decision-making are still 
developing and do not mature until a person reaches their early twenties.278 
Furthermore, the region of the brain regulating judgment is not fully mature 
during the adolescent years,279 thus impairing a young person’s ability to 
understand the consequences of his or her choices.280 Juveniles perceive risk 
differently than adults and are more enticed by the novelty of the incident.281 
“They have a higher sensitivity to reward which means that when [juveniles] 
take a risk and win the reward, they are more driven to keep taking that risk 
over and over again even when that strategy does not work anymore.”282 
Consequently, juveniles are more likely to focus on presumed short-term gains, 
not realizing how their decisions will affect their future.283 
Even though a specialized knowledge of juveniles is essential to their 
representation, the attorneys in Missouri’s current juvenile system are under-
resourced and lack sufficient training in juvenile representation. The lack of 
resources is due, in part, to the fact that the general revenue of the MSPD is 
less than half of 1 percent of the state’s General Revenue Appropriation.284 
Findings were also reported that the MSPD had the lowest per capita 
expenditure of all statewide public defender systems.285 As a result, today, 
there is only one district defender assigned to juveniles in St. Louis City and 
one district defender assigned to St. Louis County.286 Even though St. Louis 
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City’s juvenile case files have gone down exponentially, some juvenile cases 
still get contracted out to private attorneys287 due to the juvenile defenders not 
having the resources to keep up with their growing caseloads. In addition to 
their juvenile conflict cases, the private attorneys manage a caseload in the 
adult system at the same time.288 Since the private attorneys have adult clients 
with presumably more serious cases, the juvenile cases tend to receive the least 
amount of the attorney’s time.289 
In 2012, there were 80,588 new cases opened in the MSPD trial 
division,290 but only 1,923 were juvenile delinquency or status offender 
cases.291 This means that juvenile cases amounted to only 2.36% of the 
MSPD’s assigned cases.292 Even less juvenile cases were assigned in 2013, 
when the MSPD assigned 73,666 cases to the trial division, and of the 4,051 
new juvenile delinquency and status offense petitions statewide,293 the MSPD 
was assigned only 1,670 juvenile delinquency and status offender cases.294 
Even during the Youth Advocacy Unit’s dismissal, the MSPD assigned 3,380 
juvenile cases to the unit and its advocates the year it dissipated—almost two 
times as many as the following years.295 The numbers alone display how the 
Youth Advocacy Unit was a valuable resource in being adept to handle large 
juvenile caseloads. 
Accordingly, the old model of juvenile representation, in place before the 
Youth Advocacy Unit’s existence, is beginning to make an appearance again in 
Missouri’s juvenile system today. Unlike the advocates in the Youth Advocacy 
Unit, today public defenders do not interview the juvenile while he or she is in 
the detention center, before going to the detention hearing.296 The defender 
usually meets the child for the first time in court on the day of the hearing,297 
leaving the attorney very little time to review the juvenile’s case. The 
appointment of counsel is made so late that it is difficult to prepare and provide 
effective advocacy because “the attorneys only have minutes before the 
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hearing to talk with their clients, . . . investigate probable cause, and 
investigate alternatives to detention.”298 
Today, there are no concerted attempts to incorporate the concepts of the 
Youth Advocacy Unit into current representation of juveniles.299 In the 
dispositional phase, there is less advocacy than there was when the Youth 
Advocacy Unit was in place.300 Defenders are no longer using dispositional 
specialists or regularly offering alternatives to the DJO’s disposition.301 Now, 
it is a very different model.302 The defenders simply cross-examine the DJO 
and sometimes will bring in the parents to testify that they want their child 
home and about the efforts the parents will put forth at home for their child.303 
When juveniles feel as if their voice has not been heard, they are less likely to 
engage in the consequences of the final disposition.304 However, if juveniles 
feel like the judge really heard them, their case was presented, and they were 
fully advocated for, they are more likely to engage in the court’s rehabilitative 
efforts.305 The consequences of juveniles not having a say in their disposition is 
much greater than the risk of the juveniles going back to prison later in life. If 
juveniles have a say, it may ultimately prevent them from returning to the 
system that the defenders are supposed to be advocating to keep them out of. 
In the years after the Youth Advocacy Unit’s dissolution until just recently, 
new attorneys were assigned juvenile cases, using juvenile courts as “training 
grounds to prepare public defenders for adult cases.”306 Thus, juveniles were 
often left with an attorney with no experience and no training on how to 
represent juveniles. However, in the spring of 2013, the National Juvenile 
Defender Center conducted an assessment of Missouri’s juvenile defense 
representation in delinquency proceedings,307 which revealed significant 
deficiencies in juvenile representation. Since the assessment, the MSPD has 
placed more experienced attorneys in the juvenile division.308 Even though the 
MSPD is taking a step toward improving the representation for juveniles by 
providing an experienced attorney, if the attorney is not receiving any 
resources, his or her experience is not going to make a difference.309 
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Thus, the representation that defenders provide to juvenile clients must 
parallel the comprehensive representation provided to adults.310 The juvenile 
needs adequate assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, insist upon 
regularity of the proceedings, and to prepare and submit a defense.311 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although many of Missouri’s efforts may be intended to further the best 
interests of its youth, their legal right to counsel is still being ignored. Because 
of the lack of funding to stabilize the Youth Advocacy Unit, or divisions with 
similar purposes, juveniles are being denied their constitutional rights, thus 
making institutional cases like In re Gault irrelevant. Missouri’s most 
proficient resource in carrying out Gault’s mandate to counsel was the Youth 
Advocacy Unit. The unit was responsible for lowering attorney’s juvenile 
caseloads and providing more resources to support a juvenile’s disposition—
carrying the philosophy that this would keep juveniles out of institutions like 
DYS.312 The unit was also responsible for reducing the number of children 
transferred to adult court and increasing public awareness of juvenile law.313 
When the Youth Advocacy Unit disbanded, there was an instant switch back to 
the old juvenile justice system model.314 Today, the theory is to have 
experienced lawyers in the juvenile division, but the attorneys have higher 
caseloads and lack the resources to present alternatives to detention. This 
strays away from the juvenile court’s original philosophy that keeping children 
out of institutions is beneficial to the child.315 Regardless of whether 
Missouri’s rehabilitation centers are nationally recognized, the current lack of 
adequate counsel makes Missouri youth’s constitutional rights dependent on 
funding. Access to adequate counsel is not only for adults or juveniles whose 
family can afford it.316 Access to adequate counsel should be for everybody. 
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